

# Background 1

Forestry in Italy at the dawn of the new millennium:

Facing strong competition from international timber markets

 Confronting fragmentation of forest estates and therefore of domestic timber supply





# **Research questions**

- Are PES such a tool ?
- Is there any experience in Italy on this ? Which ? To what extent ?
- What can we learn from the international experience/literature?
- Are PES really an opportunity for the Italian forest entrepreneurs/landowners ?
- Can PES contribute towards creating links with tourism/recreation and forestry?





## What are PES: classification

Types of market-based payments and examples for water services (Perrot-Maître & Davis, 2001)

### Voluntary Contractual Arrangements

= direct negotiations between water users and landowners → La Esperanza hydropower producer pays the NGO Monteverde Conservation League for maintaining existing forest cover in the upper catchments - Costa Rica

#### Trading Schemes

= trade of "credits" between companies and landowners for exceeding the requirements on water use or pollution limits → The Tam-Pamlico Trading Program in USA

### Public Payment Schemes


 direct payments to farmers/forest owners for management practices that protect water quality
→ Council Regulation 1698/2005 for Rural Development 2007-2013 (Axis 2)

# A classification for the Italian context

	Voluntary Schemes	Compliant-based Schemes	Government-mediated Schemes	
Main driving forces	Profit (business) Public Relation strategy, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)	Governmental laws/regulations	Public authority role in providing environmental - ecosystem services (with no or limited market) to the community	
Main payment mechanism	Service's suppliers (forest owners or managers) directly paid by service's end-users for forest management specifically oriented to provide the service (ex. recreation).	Service's suppliers (forest owners or managers) indirectly paid by service's end- users for maintaining the forest functions (ex. NWFPs collection).	Service's suppliers (landowners indirectly paid by public authorities (responsible towards the general public => end-users for forest management specifically oriented to provide the service (ex. quality of water)	
Main instrument	Contractual agreements, tickets to access the recreational area.	Property rights regulations by selling picking permits	water tariff paid by water end- users + public funds allocation policies	
Case- Studies in Italy	Adventure Parks (SFM certification, env. Education,)	Mushrooms Collection for recreation (C offset)	Water Supply (Agro-env. Payments)	

Case-studies analysis: a general description				
	Adventure Parks	Mushrooms Collection activity	Water Supply	
Forest service	Recreation	Recreation and NWFPs production	Maintenance of water quality and water cycle regulation	
Where in Italy?	About 65 APs, mainly in mountain areas of interest for tourism	Almost in all the Italian Mountain Communities	In Piedmont and Emilia- Romagna Regions	
Legal framework	Property rights regulations, Safety laws	Regional forest laws/mushrooms collection regulations	National and regional laws (L. 36/94; Piedmont: LR 17/97, LR 16/99, DGR 38-8849/2008; Emilia-Romagna).	
Payment med	hanism and instrument	s		
Forest owners or managers	Private or public entrepreneurs	Mountain Community, Municipality; Regole	Mountain Communities	
Paid by whom?	Visitors/tourists	Visitors/tourists	Watershed authorities (ATOs)	
For what?	Accessing/using the Adventure Park's facilities	Getting the right to collect wild mushrooms in forests	Reducing soil erosion and other hydro-geological risks	
By means of	Tickets selling	Picking permits selling	Regional funds + ATO funds (3-8% of water tariff)	

	Adventure Parks	Mushrooms Collection	
Market drivers	Opportunity for business based on an increasing demand for recreation in forests	Demands for recreation and specialty goods	Water supply water to citizens.
Market size estimation	Niche, but increasing (summer tourism)	Medium	Very large
on the basis of some <i>proxi</i>	Initial investment for 10-13,000 visitors/year: 250,000 € Average ticket price:10€ Payback period = 4 yrs	€ 675,000/year in 2006 in Borgotaro Consortium, with picking permit prices of €6- 15 (1 day) or €67-150 (6 months) € 260-300,000/year in 2004 and 2005 in Asiago municipality	All the water basin end- users (families, factories, farms, etc.) (ex. Piedmont region: 4,2 M of inhabitants).
Level of maturity and market structure	Low: total innovation (first APs in Valle d'Aosta, in 2001), new market under development.	High: long tradition in Italy, well-consolidated experiences (ex. Fungo di Borgotaro Consortium)	Low in practice: 2 cases High in theory: legal framework established at national level Preparatory to create a new (voluntary) market?



## Source: Rigoni, 2006

	Adventure Parks	Mushrooms Collection	Water Supply
Efficacy in income generation	High: forest area, specifically managed for recreation by a well-identified entrepreneur.	Varying from very high to low - depending on regional laws (ex. Veneto: 70% of income from mushrooms has to be re-invested in forests) and local expertise (ex. Borgotaro Consortium).	Varying from high to limited (ex. in Emilia-Roman, at least 50% of the water tariff must be used for forest nanagement activities; in Pledmont: no clearly identification of such a %). Problems in clearly identifying cause- effect relationships (=> who are the suppliers to be paid?)
Efficiency	High: limited transaction costs (forest concession agreements), short payback periods)	In general, high transaction costs Efficiency might vary from rather high (territorial marketing, forest associations) to rather low (single, small forest ownerships).	Very high transaction costs: efficiency seems to be limited >- incomplete legal framework (ex: in Piedmont, total investment needed: in 2007 34 M c/year, 50% covered throug water tariff => problems in regularly providing regional funds
Equity in benefits distribution	Low involvement of local community	Potentially high (forest associations, territorial marketing initiatives)	Unequal distribution of the funds from water tariff (concentrated in highly populated urban areas ).





